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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
vs. ) 
WESLEY ALLEN TUTTLE, ) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant-Appellant, Wesley Allen Tuttle, 
was charged by way of information with the crime of escape 
from official custody, a second degree felony, in that he 
escaped from official custody, to wit, confinement at the 
Utah State prison. Jury trial on the charges was duly begun 
on May 29, 1985, and the verdict of guilty was returned on 
May 30, 1985. On that day, Judge Wilkinson sentenced the 
Defendant to a period of one to fifteen years in the Utah 
State prison. Said sentence was to be consecutive to his 
other sentence, and issued forthwith. 
Mr. Tuttle had previously been convicted of 
capital homicide, a first degree felony, and sentenced to 
life imprisonment, Purtherf his commitment issued and he 
was received at the Utah State prison on May 24, 1984. (See 
Trial Exhibit No. lf Record at 104). However, there was no 
evidence available from the state's witnesses as to any 
post-sentence proceedings, such as a notice of appeal or 
granting of a new trial, or parole status. (Record at 
108). 
On August 31, 1984, Mr. Tuttle was working under 
Mr. Gerald Dowson, vocational instructor, as an electrician. 
He was assigned various jobs by Mr. Dowson in the prison. 
(Record at 108). On that day he was assigned with Mr. 
Eugene Brady to repair some lights in the visiting room of 
the medium security section of the prison. (Record at 
113). Mr. Tuttle could not have known of the exact location 
of this assignment until that morning shortly before he was 
sent. (Record at 121). 
Shortly after 9:00 a.m. on August 31, 1984, a 
Mr. William Campbell, an accountant in the administrative 
office of the prison, heard a lot of construction noise at 
the fire escape door to the administration offices. With 
two female co-workers, Mr. Campbell went over to investigate 
the noise after a "ridiculously long time". (Record at 133). 
Upon opening the door he saw one individual in civilian 
overalls and two prison inmates, one of whom was Mr. Tuttle. 
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Mr. Tuttle walked past Mr. Campbell and through the 
administration offices out of the door. He was shortly 
followed by the other inmate, and after a brief conversation 
with Mr. Campbell the man in the overalls also left through 
the offices. Further, Mr. Campbell testified that inmates 
are often allowed beyond the check points and through the 
offices there. (Record at 135). 
The State next called Officer Craig Rasmussen, 
an Investigator. He testified that he found Mr. Eugene 
Brady in the bushes by the river, (Record at 154), saw the 
other prisoner, Mr. Wood in custody on a road outside the 
prison, (Record at 155), and next saw Mr. Tuttle in Las 
Vegas when he brought him back from there. (Record at 
162). 
The State then rested, and the defense began 
calling witnesses for its case. The first witness called by 
the defense was Merril Barnes, Deputy Warden of the prison 
at the time. He testified that Mr. Tuttle had been outside 
of the building with Mr. Dowson without authorization in the 
past, (Record at 172), including outside the compound fence, 
(Record at 173), confirming Mr. Dowson's previous testimony 
as to those occurances. (Record at 127-8). Mr. Barnes 
further testified as to his previous work as a social worker 
in the prison, and that there is a different society in 
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prison with its own ways and taboos, and that threats must 
be considered real in prison. (Record at 174-6). 
The defense also called Charles Puett who was 
an inmate at the Utah State prison at the time, having been 
convicted of insufficent funds on a check. He testifed that 
he had seen Mr. Tuttle threatened a number of times, and 
that people who were convicted of the crime Mr. Tuttle had been 
were threatened a lot, and those threats were extremely serious. 
(Record at 183-4). He indicated that there had been one 
murder and one stabbing in the last two months. On cross 
examination, he testified that he had seen a knife pulled on 
Mr. Tuttle one of the times when he knew Mr. Tuttle had been 
threatened. 
The defense then called Mr. Darrell Eugene Brady, 
a prisoner at the Utah State prison. Mr. Brady was one of 
the individuals who left the prison with Mr. Tuttle, 
and was the one wearing the overalls that Mr. Campbell saw. 
Mr. Brady and Mr. Tuttle were friends in the prison, and 
they would "back each other up" as to any problems that 
either of them would have. (Record at 192). Further, 
any problem that was one of theirs was the other's problem 
as well, as that was the way of the prison. (Record at 
202). 
On the day that they left the prison, they were 
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working in the visiting room. Mr. Brady went to the bathroom, 
and was informed by a fellow inmate that if he or Mr. Tuttle 
went back down to the main corridor, someone was going to 
get killed. (Record at 195). Mr. Brady then walked back 
into the visiting room and told Mr. Tuttle "we have big 
problems", grabbed a pry bar, and went through the visiting 
room door into the visiting yard. (Record at 197). After 
leaving the yard, they went through a gate that just happened 
to be open, which they could not have known would have been 
open. They then went through an exterior door into the main 
administration building, up through some steps, and were 
attempting to break through the door when Mr. Campbell 
opened it. Further, Mr. Tuttle had merely followed Mr. 
Brady after he told him of the trouble, and they had had no 
contact until after the last door. (Record at 199. ) 
The defense next called a Frank Saucedo who was 
a fellow prisoner in the prison with Mr. Tuttle. He testified 
that he had been asked to be a back up for a fight that was 
to occur the day that Mr. Tuttle left. He and other individuals 
were waiting for Mr. Tuttle and Mr. Brady to come back down 
the hall at the lunch hour. However, no fight occured as 
Mr. Tuttle and Mr. Brady left the prison. (Record at 206). 
With that testimony, the defense rest. 
On May 30, 1985, the Court discussed jury instructions 
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with counsel for the parties, and ultimately instructed the 
jury. The Defendant requested instruction on compulsion 
which tracked the statue which sets forth the defense of 
compulsion, located at Section 76-2-302, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended. (Record at 38). The Court gave that 
instruction, but also gave the Plaintiff's Requested 
Instruction Number 9, as modified, (Record at 51), ultimately 
as the Court's instruction number 19, (Record at 68). This 
instruction added additional elements to the defense of 
compulsion not within the statute. 
After argument by counsel, the jury went out and 
after deliberating for approximately one hour, returned a 
verdict of guilty. The Defendant waived his right to be 
sentenced not sooner than two days after conviction, and was 
sentenced at that time for a period of one to fifteen years 
in the Utah State prison, said sentence to be consecutive 
to the one he was serving. On the 27th day of June, 1985, 
Notice of Appeal was duly filed in the District Court. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THAT THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY INSTRUCTED 
THE JURY REGARDING THE DEFENSE OF COMPULSION. 
The defense of compulsion is set forth in the 
statutes in Section 76-2-302, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended. In instructing the jury as to the defense of 
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compulsion, the trial court instructed as to the elements 
contained within the statute to define the defense, and in 
addition, place three other restrictions on the defense as 
additional elements which must be born out before the 
defense obtains. It was improper to place these additional 
burdens upon the Defendant in the defense of his case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THAT THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY INSTRUCTED 
THE JURY REGARDING THE DEFENSE OF COMPULSION 
Mr. Tuttle's defense at the time of trial was 
compulsion. The defense of compulsion is set forth in 
Section 76-2-302, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 
which states, in pertinent part: 
A person is not guilty of an offense 
when he engaged in the proscribed conduct 
because he was coerced to do so by the 
use or threatened imminent use of unlawful 
physical force upon him or a third person, 
which force or threatened force a person 
of reasonable firmness in his situation 
would not have resisted. 
Pursuant to that, the Defendant requested an instruction 
setting forth those elements, contained in Defendant's 
Request Instructions Number 1. This instruction was given 
by the Court as its Instruction Number 18. 
The Plaintiff, however, requested a different 
Instruction on the defense of duress or compulsion, its 
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proposed Instruction Number 9, (Record at 51). The Court 
deleted paragraph 3 from that proposed instruction, and gave 
the remainder as Instruction Number 19. (Record at 68). 
None of these three additional elements and requirements for 
the defense of compulsion appear anywhere within the statute 
on compulsion. 
The provisions of the Criminal Code dictate that 
resort should be had solely to matters contained in the code 
to determine what are the elements of the crimes and, where 
listed, the elements of any defense. Section 76-1-103, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, provides, in pertinent 
part: 
The provisions of this code (Utah Criminal 
Code) shall govern the construction of, 
the punishment for, and defenses against 
any offense defined in this code or, 
except where otherwise specifically provided 
or the context otherwise requires, any 
offense defined outside this code; provided 
such offense was committed after the 
effective date of this code. 
In the context of the case at bar, it is 
constitutionally mandated that the trial judge not add 
the additional elements to the defense of compulsion. 
That is because by adding the additional elements to the 
defense the defense was thereby narrowed, and thus the scope 
of the criminal offenses would have been enlarged. In 
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essence, therefore, the trial court was expanding the 
definition of a crime, which is not permissable. 
Article 5 Section 1 of the Utah Constitution provides 
for the three departments of government and the requirement 
that one department shall not exercise the powers and 
authorities of another department. In the case at bar, the 
definition of a crime is a legislative function, and the 
Courts cannot enlarge upon that definition. In State vs. 
Johnson, 44 Utah 18, 137 P 632 (UT 1913), the Defendant was 
convicted of a statute that provided that "every person who 
is guilty of the infamoos crime against nature commited 
with mankind or with animal, it is punishable by imprisonment 
, . ." The statutes of the state of Utah at that time did 
not designated or mention a particular act as constituting 
the crime. The Supreme Court reveresed, on the basis that 
it would in essence be a judicial definition of a crime and 
a usurpation of the legislative function. The Court stated 
at Page 26: 
This principal is also embedded in our 
Constitution. Section 1 of article 5 of 
the Constitution of this state provides 
that the "powers of the government of the 
State of Utah shall be divided into three 
distinct departments, the legislative, the 
executive, and the judicial; and no person 
charged with the exercise of the powers 
properly belonging to one of these, 
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departments, shall exercise any functions 
pertaining to either of the others, except 
in the cases herein expressly directed or 
permitted." There is no provision of 
the Constitution that either expressly 
or otherwise directs or permits the 
courts of this state to denounce and 
punish as crimes acts and omissions 
not made punishable by statute; hence 
to do what we are urged would be in 
violation of both the letter and the spirit 
of the constitution. 
The State vs. Johnson case was sited with approval 
in State vs. Gallion, 572 P2d. 683 (UT 1977). That case 
also dealt with the "non-delegation doctrine" with regard 
to a claim under the Controlled Substances Act. The Act at 
that time provided that all drugs listed on a particular 
schedule were illegal under the Act, and provided that the 
Attorney General of the State of Utah could add substances 
to that list by administrative action. The Court found that 
to be an illegal and unconstitional delegation of legislative 
power, and struck that provision of the Code. Stating, 
at Page 690: 
A determination of the elements of a 
crime and the appropriate punishment 
therefor are, under our Constitutional 
system, judgments, which must be made 
exclusively by the Legislature. 
See also 21 Amercian Jurispurdence 2nd, Criminal Law, Section 
11, Page 124. 
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The trial court in its instruction added three 
elements to the defense of compulsion. These were that: (1), 
the Defendant was faced with a specific thread of substantial 
body injury in the immediate future; (2), that there was not 
time to make a complaint to the authorities, or there was 
history of futile complaints; and (3), that the individual 
immediately report to the authorities when he has obtained a 
position of safety from the immediate threat. These factors 
make actions before and after the time of the offense 
relevant to a determination as to whether or not there had 
been a crime committed. Therefore/ even amongst themselves, 
they are inconsistent with a definition of the crime. 
However, they clearly go beyond the elements of the defense 
of compulsion set forth in the statute, Section 76-2-302. 
As such, they reduce the number of times when the defense 
of compulsion applies, and thereby enlarges the times that 
crimes are committed. As a result, it constitutes an improper 
broadening of the definition of crimes and their defenses by 
the judiciary as well as being contrary to the provisions of 
the criminal code concerning the defintion of crimes and 
the defenses thereto. On both bases, it deprived the 
Defendant of his right to have his defense presented to a 
jury. 
-11-
CONCLUSION 
The trial Court erred in failing to instruct the jury 
properly with regard to the defense of compulsion. It added 
additional elements to the defense of compulsion not found 
within the statute, thereby enlarging the definition and 
ambit of those acts which are criminal. Such was improper. 
Since compulsion was the Defendant's only defense, this 
Court should reverse the conviction and remand the case for 
a new trial upon proper instructions. 
DATED this day of December, 1985. 
ROBERTS & ROBERTS 
By 
THOM D. ROBERTS 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the day of December, 
1985, I hand delivered four copies of the foregoing APPELLANT'S 
BRIEF to David Wilkinson, Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent, 
Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt 
Lake City, Utah. 
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76-8-309. Escape - Term for escape from state 
prison. (1) A person is guilty of escape if he escapes from 
official custody. 
(2) The offense is a felony of the second degree if: 
(a) The actor employs force, threat, or a deadly 
weapon against any person to effect the escape; or 
(b) The actor escapes from confinement in the 
state prison. Otherwise, escape is a class B misdemeanor. 
(3) "Official custody/1 for the purpose of this 
sectionf means arrest, custody in a penal institution, jail, 
an institution for confinement of juvenile offenders, or 
other confinement pursuant to an order of the Court. For 
purposes of this section a person is deemed to be confined 
in the Utah state prison if he has been sentenced and 
committed and the sentence has not been terminated or voided 
or the prisoner is not on parole. 
(4) The term imposed upon a person escaping 
confinement in the state prison shall commence from the time 
that actor would otherwise have been discharged from the 
prison on the term or terms which he was serving. 
ADD-1 
76-2-302. Compulsion - (1) A person is not guilty 
of an offense when he engaged in the proscribed conduct 
because he was coerced to do so by the use or threatened 
imminent use of unlawful physical force upon him or a third 
person, which force or threatened force a person of reasonable 
firmness in his situation would not have resisted* 
(2) The defense of compulsion provided by this 
section shall be unavailable to a person who intentionally, 
knowingly, or recklessly places himself in a situation in 
which it is probable that he will be subjected to duress, 
(3) A married woman is not entitled, by reason 
of the presence of her husband, to any presumption of 
compulsion or to any defense of compulsion except as in 
subsection (1) provided. 
ADD-2 
INSTRUCTION 
You are instructed that pursuant to the laws of the 
State of Utah, it is a complete defense to the charge in this 
case if the Defendant acted under compulsion. Compulsion under 
the law is when an individual engaged in prescribed conduct 
because he was coerced to do so by the use or threatened imminent 
use of unlawful physical force upon him, or a third person, 
which force or threatened force a person of reasonable firmness 
in tnat individual situation would not have resisted. 
Therefore, unless the State proves to your satisfaction 
and beyond a reasonable dojbt that the above elements of compul-
sion Jid not exist, it shall be your duty to return a verdict of 
not guilty. 
ADD-3 
i 
INSTRUCTION NO. l l 
You are instructed that the defense of duress or 
compulsion is available only if the following conditions existed 
at the time of the escape: 
1. The defendant was faced with a specific threat of 
death or substantial bodily injury in the immediate future. 
2. There is not time for a complaint to authorities or 
there exists a history of futile complaints which make any result 
from such complaint illusory. 
3. The prisoner immediately reports to the proper 
authorities when he has attained a position of safety from the 
immediate threat. 
If you find beyond a reasonable doubt from your con-
sideration of all the evidence that all these conditions did not 
exist at the time of the escape, then you should find that the 
defense of duress or compulsion is not available to the defen-
dant . 
ADD-4 
